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Surveying the Safety Culture of
Academic Laboratories
By Emily Faulconer, Zachary Dixon, John C. Griffith, and Hayden Frank

The university traditionally has
been the foundation for young
adults’ professional development,
yet the proclivity toward safety
culture has garnered less focus
in higher education than in the
workforce. A survey of faculty at
a medium-sized, research-active,
private institution revealed specific
areas of policy noncompliance as
well as specific safety attitudes that
can be targeted for interventions.
Albeit a snapshot view, the survey
implies that safety needs better
representation in the classroom,
teaching laboratories, and research
facilities at universities. Safety
is not abandoned by any means,
and there is a strong presence of
safety-oriented individuals, but
the data show barriers to safety
do exist that need to be addressed.
The implications of this smallscale study serve as a foundation
for a more comprehensive multiinstitutional study in the future.
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any universities offer laboratory courses
in support of science
lecture courses. A laboratory experience offers the opportunity for students to interact
with and manipulate instruments
and materials in order to explore
scientific theories. The National
Research Council emphasizes the
importance of maintaining student
safety in laboratory settings (NRC,
2014). The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) governs
workplace health and safety. Within
this act, safety in a laboratory setting is addressed through the Hazard Communication Standard, the
Laboratory Standard, and the General Duty Clause. These standards
do not cover public sector workers
or nonemployees such as students
in a teaching laboratory (Stroud
& Roy, 2009), though many states
have OSHA-approved state plans
that do cover public sector workers. Some states have safety statutes
that are applicable to nonemployees
such as students in academic labs.
While many institutions adopted
the Lab Standard for employees and
students, it often replaced safety
education for students to the detriment of both safety competency and
safety ethics (Hill, 2012). Academic laboratory safety programs can
benefit from adopting federal and
industry safety standards such as
those in the OSHA Process Safety
Standard and the NIOSH Pocket
Guide (Barsan, 2007; Langerman,
2009). Professional organizations
also offer key resources, including
the American Chemical Society’s

report “Creating Safety Cultures
in Academic Institutions,” the National Research Council’s Prudent
Practices in the Laboratory: Handling and Management of Chemical
Hazards, and the National Science
Teaching Association’s Safety Blog
and Safety Issue Papers (Hill, 2012;
NRC, 2011; NSTA, 2020).
Despite these guidelines, accidents do happen in higher education
teaching and research laboratories.
Many accidents are relatively minor.
In a 2018 study, the most prevalent
category of compensable accidents
were cuts, lacerations, and punctures
(32%); exposure to blood and body
fluids through needle-sticks; animal
bites and other mechanisms (25%);
and chemical exposures (19%)
(Gosavi et al., 2018). However, some
lab accidents cause permanent debilitating injuries or are fatal (Carson,
2014; Gibson et al., 2014; Jia, 2016;
Kemsley, 2016; Van Noorden, 2011).
Investigations into significant
academic laboratory accidents reveal
systematic safety failures (ISHN,
2011; Benderly, 2016b). Within the
aviation, nuclear, and medical fields,
there is abundant safety culture research, but less exploration of safety
culture within higher education
outside of these fields (Gutierrez et
al., 2013; NRC, 2014; Schroder et
al., 2016). While safety culture has
a variety of definitions (Wiegmann
et al., 2004), here we define safety
culture as one in which all individuals feel responsible for safety, where
employees proactively identify unsafe conditions and behaviors and
intervene to correct them, and employers place the intrinsic value of
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individuals within the organization
above their monetary significance.
The small collection of studies on
academic laboratories reveal weak
safety cultures (Ayi & Hon, 2018;
Eldridge, 2012; Gosavi et al., 2018;
Gutierrez et al., 2013; Van Noorden,
2011). Of practical significance,
motivation, accident experience, and
safety training significantly influenced safety culture and incidents
(Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Ferjencik
& Jalovy, 2010; Wu et al., 2007). The
presence of a safety manager and a
safety committee also influence safety
culture (NRC, 2014; Wu et al., 2007).
Moderating factors included gender,
age/experience, and title (McEwen
et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2007). For
teaching laboratories, student understanding of safety can be used as a
proxy for measuring safety culture
effectiveness. Studies show students
in teaching laboratories have deficient
safety knowledge (Adane & Abejee,
2012; Al-Shuaili & Al-Muammari,
2010; Karapantsios et al., 2008).
This could be addressed by embedding competencies in chemical safety

information into the undergraduate
curriculum (Sigmann, 2018).
A proactive safety culture is generated through a core commitment to
safety in all levels of an organization
(NRC, 2014). Safety as a core value
can be communicated many ways,
including a nonpunitive reporting
system and using safety in faculty performance reviews (Benderly, 2016a).
Recognition of safety performance
has been noted in safety culture
surveys to be an area for growth
(Gutierrez et al., 2013). Challenges
to an effective safety culture include
knowledge gaps, the hierarchical
system in academia, and the unique
safety considerations of research labs
compared to educational labs (NRC,
2014). This is further complicated by
the difficulty in changing safety behavior through interventions (Reniers
et al., 2014). Figure 1 presents a theoretical framework for safety culture.
It is clear that very serious safety
concerns exist in academic laboratories. It is also clear that safety culture
is complex. The purpose of this study
is to contribute to the small body of

work in this area by investigating
safety culture at a research-active
private university, specifically exploring several metrics of safety culture
participation and self-efficacy. We
hypothesized the following:
1. Less than 25% of the potential
participant pool would respond to
the survey.
2. Training has a positive impact
on faculty self-efficacy regarding
awareness and use of safety policies and procedures.
3. Belief that the organization is
engaged in the safety culture at
multiple levels has a positive
impact on faculty self-efficacy
regarding awareness and use of
safety policies and procedures.

Material and methods
Data were collected from principal
investigators (PIs) and laboratory
supervisors (LSs) employed at a medium-sized, private university. Participants were selected using purposive sampling, targeting those who
both meet the definition of a chemi-

FIGURE 1
Safety Culture Theoretical Framework
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cal worker and those who have PI or
LS responsibilities. The institution
has a Carnegie Classification of R3,
a “moderate research” institution.
Research activities at this institution
garner both internal and external
funding support.
Faculty were asked to complete
a survey on their knowledge and
perspectives regarding institutional safety culture. The survey was
deemed exempt by the institutional
review board prior to administration
of the survey.
A cross-sectional survey was used,
developed by faculty across multiple
disciplines, including those with expertise in fire safety, chemical safety,
and science communication. The
survey tool consisted of 11 closed
questions. QuestionPro was used to
administer the surveys anonymously.
Survey data were collected in spring
2019. Responses were voluntary. All
survey data were treated as nominal.
The number of respondents prevented
inferential statistics; descriptive statistics were applied.

Results and discussion
Response rate
A hallmark of a strong safety culture is engagement (Nahrgang et al.,
2011). However, as hypothesized,
our survey was met with a low response rate. Of the 52 LSs or PIs
identified in the sample institution,
only eight responded to the survey
device, resulting in a 15% response
rate and confirming our hypothesis
that less than 25% of the potential
participant pool would respond to
the survey. The lack of participation
in this study from the potential participant pool indicates engagement
as an important shortcoming of the
sample institution’s safety culture.
Even from the outset of the study,
faculty engagement in lab safety
culture represented a problematic
hurdle. As the research team prepared for data collection, it was
found that the sample institution did

20

not have an accurate or complete
picture of its LS or PI population. No
definitive list of LSs or PIs existed on
a university, college, department, or
program level. Without a definitive
list of LSs or PIs, this study relied on
three rounds of distinct solicitation:
one by distribution of the survey
devised through an institutional
full-time faculty listserv; a second
round distributed through collegelevel administrative staff; and a
third distributed directly to LS and
PI faculty identified by department
chairs, program chairs, and other
department-level administrative
staff. In total, the research team contacted 42 department and program
chairs, as well as other administrative
staff, who collectively identified 52
faculty members as either LSs or PIs.
The lack of institutional awareness
of its critical laboratory personnel
speaks to a foundational engagement
problem. Without clear or accurate
accounting of a lab population, it is
difficult to engage that population
in an institutional culture of safety.
During data collection, the research team also experienced confusion from institutional points of contact about what constituted a “laboratory environment” or “chemical
workers.” Some contacts questioned
whether or not their labs qualified
for participation in the study. Some
points of contact initially rejected
our request to distribute the survey
due to a perceived lack of laboratory spaces within that institutional
division. This confusion about what
constitutes a lab in which professionalized safety protocols are required represents something of an
unexpected confounding variable in
this study. The confusion expressed
by college, department, and program
contacts suggests there may be
additional faculty whose labs and
work qualifies them for participation in this study, but who were not
identified or made aware or did not
self-identify to participate, despite

the key terms of “laboratory environment” and “chemical worker” being
defined in the recruitment messaging.
This observed confusion speaks to
the problem of cultural engagement.
Without accurate accounting of institutional lab personnel, communication about what conditions warrant
professionalized lab safety practices
is unlikely to disseminate adequately
throughout that population. Without
adequate communication of fundamental lab safety culture tenants
and practices, faculty are unlikely to
become or remain actively engaged
in a culture of practice.

Training
According to OSHA, a Chemical
Hygiene Plan (CHP) must address
specific criteria, including but not
limited to (1) the criteria an employer will use to determine and implement hazard control measures, including use of personal protective
equipment (PPE) and hygiene practices and (2) methods and observations that may be used to detect the
presence or release of a hazardous
chemical, (3) physical and health
hazards of chemicals in the work
area, and (4) the measures workers can take to protect themselves
from these hazards, including the
use of PPE (OSHA, 2011b). While
OSHA mandates training on the Lab
Standard (and thus the CHP) at the
time of appointment or when duties or hazards change, the institution studied here has mandated that
Lab Standard training occur annually. Five of the eight respondents
(62.5%) indicated they had been
trained on the use of PPE in the
last 12 months. Three respondents
(37.5%) reported they had not been
trained on PPE use, with one being
employed over 12 months and two
employed less than 12 months. As
PIs and LSs, the respondents also
have been delegated responsibility through the CHP for selecting
appropriate PPE for an activity in
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their work area. The same distribution was reported for being trained
on PPE selection, with 62.5% reporting adequate training. Despite
the training deficiencies, all respondents indicated confidence in selecting appropriate PPE.
Two respondents (25%) reported
being trained on the institution’s
CHP within the last year, while one
(12.5%) reported training in the last
five years. Five faculty (62.5%)
reported never being trained on the
CHP, with two being employed for
more than 12 months. Institutional
policy mandates initial training with
annual refresher training, meaning
37.5% of faculty were noncompliant. Training covered key concepts
including the digital location of the
CHP and Safety Data Sheets (SDS),
the presence of an anonymous safety
reporting system, the institutional
hazardous waste (HW) disposal
procedures, and key points of contact for safety within the institution.
Respondent knowledge of each was
explored in the survey (Table 1).
While only half of the respondents
had been trained on the CHP, the
majority knew how to access the
electronic SDS. The response rate
was too low to reliably report correlations between receiving training
and responses on the key aspects of
training.
Of substantial concern is the
lack of knowledge of an established
procedure for the handling and disposal of hazardous waste. The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (40 CFR 262.17[a]) mandates
that hazardous waste personnel at
large quantity generators (LQGs)
are trained, at a minimum, to ensure facility personnel are able to
respond effectively to emergencies
involving hazardous waste (EPA,
2016). Failure to meet these training
requirements can result in civil and
criminal penalties. Training must
occur within six months of job
placement and retraining must occur

annually. Half of the respondents
reported training within the last year.
Another 37.5% reported no training,
but employment less than 12 months.
Only one respondent (12.5%) was
clearly in violation of this training
mandate, reporting training within
the last five years. Only 57% of respondents indicated an established
procedure for handling and disposal
of hazardous waste. The sample size
prevented reliable analysis of correlations, however, there are some
interesting potential relationships.
While knowledge of HW disposal
procedures did appear to correlate
with training, confidence in making
HW determinations did not appear
to correlate with training. Similarly,
there did not appear to be a correlation between those who identified a
standard procedure for handling HW
and those who felt confident handling
HW. The relationship between safety
training and self-efficacy warrants
further investigation.
While this institution has decentralized training, current efforts are
aimed at centralizing basic training
through an online training platform
through the institution’s learning
management system. Even with
centralized training, certain topics
(e.g., procedure-specific standard
operating procedures [SOPs] and
advanced engineering controls) will
require hands-on training led by
the PI or the LS. Six respondents
(85.7%) indicated their responsibil-

ity for providing training for specific
hazards in their work area. Only
one respondent disagreed with this
responsibility.

Lab practices
Faculty were asked to consider their
laboratory practices, facilities, and
equipment (Table 2). When queried
about responsibility for inspecting laboratory equipment in their
work area for safety, most faculty
responded positively, accepting this
responsibility. Half of respondents
reported maintaining a record of
routine equipment maintenance,
while only a third reported recording equipment repair. Of concern,
half of the survey respondents reporting using defective equipment
in their work area.
According to both the American
Chemical Society and the National
Science Teaching Association, communal eyewear should be disinfected
between uses to reduce transmission
of diseases such as common head lice
(Joint Board-Council Committee on
Chemical Safety & American Chemical Society, 2009; NSTA, 2017). This
is further supported in OSHA’s Laboratory Safety Guidance, stating that
it is important to clean and disinfect
PPE prior to storage (OSHA, 2011a).
The institution’s CHP supports this
action, mandating disinfection between uses for communal eyewear.
However, only 16.7% of faculty reported adherence to this policy.

TABLE 1
Knowledge of key aspects of training.
Agree

Disagree

Know the Chemical Hygiene Plan location

42.9%

57.1%

Know how to access Safety Data Sheets

71.4%

28.6%

Knowledge of the Safety Reporting System

57.1%

42.9%

Knowledge of established hazardous waste disposal
procedures

57.1%

42.9%

Know the safety points of contact within the institution

57.1%

42.9%
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TABLE 2
Faculty perceptions regarding facilities and equipment.
Agree

Disagree

Responsible for inspecting equipment for safety

85.7%

14.3%

Responsible for performing chemical inventory maintenance

85.7%

14.3%

GFI outlets present near water sources

33.3%

66.7%

ANSI-coded eye protection

16.7%

83.3%

Adequate exhaust ventilation

33.3%

66.7%

Adequate equipment storage

33.3%

66.7%

≥1 ABC fire extinguisher

66.7%

33.3%

Safety culture

≥1 fire blanket

0%

100%

≥1 eyewash station

83.3%

16.7%

≥1 safety shower

83.3%

16.7%

≥1 chemical spill kit

66.7%

33.3%

Faculty were surveyed on their
engagement with the institutional
safety culture through a variety of
mechanisms, including communication, engagement, and perceptions of institutional commitment
to safety. In faculty to institutional
communication, all respondents
reported having contacted safety
personnel within the last year, with
83% notifying safety personnel of
existing or potential safety hazards
and 83% requesting safety-related
professional development within
the last year. However, two individuals (33%) did not receive communication back from the institution as
a result of this effort. One tactic to
close this loop is to streamline the
communication method between
faculty and the Environmental
Health and Safety Office.
A large portion of respondents
(83%) reported taking an active role
in preparing safety procedures within
their own work area, though fewer reported engagement at the department
or college level (67%). However, at
the campus or institution level, 83%
reported involvement in this responsibility. The nature of the involvement
was not explored.
Only 17% of respondents felt that
the institution provided adequate
resources to ensure safety. The same
number of respondents also disagreed
with the statement that the institution
took action regarding safety issues
raised by employees. Because a proactive safety culture requires a core

Most faculty accepted responsibility for performing chemical inventory
maintenance for chemicals. In regard
to chemical storage, 66.7% of faculty
reported storing chemicals by their
hazard class, which is the appropriate
method, while 16.7% reported storing chemicals by frequency of use,
and another 16.7% reported storing
chemicals according to the project the
chemicals were used for. It is possible
that this level of storage was used as
the primary method of segregating
chemicals and that segregation by
hazards was a secondary level of segregation, but that was not identifiable
in this survey. Alphabetical storage is
an antiquated method that no faculty
reported using.

Facilities and equipment
A third of faculty surveyed were unsure if their work area had appropriate GFI outlets near water sources
and 16.7% reported a need for GFI
outlets near water sources in their
work area. A third of faculty were
unsure if their work area provided
adequate equipment storage, another
third of faculty responded they had
adequate equipment storage, and
the final third indicated insufficient
equipment storage.

22

fire extinguisher or unsure about the
presence of a fire extinguisher. There
is no explicit requirement for fire
blankets in laboratories. However,
NFPA 45 Standard on Fire Protection
for Laboratories Using Chemicals
(section 4.6.3.2) does require that
procedures for extinguishing clothing
fires are established (NFPA, 2019).
Fire blankets can be a useful tool in
such a procedure.

Half of faculty surveyed were
unsure if the eye protection used
in their work area was appropriate
for the hazards present. In OSHA’s
General Industry Standard (29 CFR
1910.133), the law states that “the
employer shall ensure that each affected employee uses appropriate eye
or face protection…”, referring to the
standards set by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
the International Safety Equipment
Association (OSHA, 2011a). ANSI
Z87+ protects against high-velocity
impact, Z87 is low-velocity blunt
impact, D3 protects against chemical
splashes, D4 protects against dust,
and D5 protects against fine dust.
All eyewear must be marked with its
category. Products for smaller head
sizes are marked with the letter “H.”
The majority of faculty reported
one or more fire extinguishers, eyewash stations, safety showers, and
chemical spill kits in their work areas.
Overall, faculty were confident in
knowing the presence or absence of
these safety response items, with only
one respondent indicating “unsure”
in regard to the presence of a class
ABC fire extinguisher. It is unclear
if this respondent was unsure about
the ABC classification of an existing
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commitment to safety from all levels,
feedback must be taken seriously in
order to address false perceptions
appropriately and promote open communication. While the sample size
prevents reporting of a correlation,
it is interesting that those who indicated they know the point of contact
in administration regarding safety
appeared to be more likely to support the statement that administrators
take action on safety issues raised by
employees. This potential correlation
justifies further investigation in future
studies.
Another question that highlighted
concerns with self-efficacy focused
on faculty confidence that their
laboratory practices met federal
guidelines. Surprisingly, only 17%
of faculty agreed that their laboratory
met guidelines, with no respondents
suggesting they strongly agreed.
Half of the respondents were unsure
if they met guidelines while 33%
strongly disagreed, suggesting they
are aware that they are not meeting
federal safety guidelines. It is unclear
if this understanding was achieved
through this survey or prior to this
survey. Question placement could
have biased this question. The final
question of the survey suggested
hope: Eighty-three percent of respondents suggested they would support
a nonpunitive review of their work
area for compliance with federal and
institutional guidelines, with most
suggesting they strongly agreed
with this. With this review executed
through the Environmental Health
and Safety Office, strong communication between faculty and safety
personnel can help develop a safety
community rather than a confrontational or punitive atmosphere.

not to report significance results so
as not to mislead the reader. However, it should be noted that low
survey response rates may be a
symptom of a larger issue of organizations placing too little emphasis on safety as a discipline. With a
limited respondent pool, it was not
possible to look for correlations between safety attitudes and disciplinary expertise, industry connections,
or years of experience.
Geographic limitation of this survey is a limitation. Results may be
different based on geographical scope.
Safety may be viewed differently in
industrial areas of the United States,
thereby generating different levels of
survey response and attitudes toward
safety practice.
The design of this study did not
analyze reliability and the results
were not confirmed with known group
validity because it is unlikely such
group validity exists for the sample
population. This limitation leads
to low external validity. This study
provides insight into safety culture
at the test university, but does not
necessarily describe safety culture in
teaching and research laboratories at
other institutions, even of similar size
and composition. Future work will
include multiple universities in order
to improve external validity.
Measurement errors may have occurred where survey statistics differ
from the true value due to the data
collection methods. Poor question
wording and a poor understanding of
survey questions are confounding factors that are mechanisms for this error.
Bias is a concern in voluntary selfresponse, which may over-represent
strong opinions. It is unclear how this
limitation impacted the results.

Limitations

Broader implications

Nonresponse error is a significant
limitation of this study. The n of
eight did not allow us to confidently
determine if correlation results were
statistically significant. We elected

Challenges abound, some that mirror
“No news is good news” or “Do we
have to report the minor accident?”
However, this leads to “Tomb Stone
Safety” where procedures are not

written and reviewed until after a
major accident happens (Del Balzo,
2017). Safety programs, inspections,
and training cost money and time.
However, effective policies and
training prepare faculty, students,
and/or employees to act in crisis situations or, preferably, before an accident occurs. A modern take on safety
culture applies three tenets: safety is
an ethical responsibility, people are
the solution instead of the problem,
and safety is the presence of positive
capacities rather than the absence of
negative events (Dekker, 2014).
Safety is a critical aspect of any
organizational mission. The loss of
life, limb, or function is a huge price
to pay for not (1) having adequate
safety measures in place where (2)
students and faculty know how to
access them in order to (3) develop
work behaviors that include ingrained
awareness and safety practices.
Students and faculty alike conduct
experiments and labs that model
procedures they may encounter out
of the university setting. Safety is a
discipline. It goes beyond common
sense and should be inculcated at the
earliest stage of professional development. Safety as a discipline requires
continuous reinforcement for a safety
culture to flourish. Safety awareness
and safety attitudes are transferable
skills. Unfortunately, the world is
not an inherently safe place. Safety
is not a passive activity nor is it the
absence of accidents. When accidents
or injuries occur, after-action reporting is necessary not only to identify
what happened, but to prevent similar
occurrences from happening again.
The aviation and medical fields
have taken the lead on root-cause
analysis and after-action reporting,
but the importance of well-organized
safety programs crosses over into
other industries as well (Del Balzo,
2017). Safety is a concerted effort by
organizational leadership and team
members to minimize mistakes and
injuries (Lundell & Marcham, 2018).
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Conclusions
A strong safety culture has engaged employees. One of the key
limitations of this study —the small
sample size—highlights the concern over lack of engagement. We
hypothesized that less than 25% of
the potential participant pool would
respond to the survey; 15% did. The
low participation rate in this study
may be due to attitudes toward safety and reluctance in reporting safety
perceptions and behaviors.
The second hypothesis was that
training has a positive impact on
faculty’s belief in their ability to succeed regarding use of safety policies
and procedures. While correlations
in this study have low significance
due to the low participation rate,
we can see that there appears to be
a relationship between training and
key aspects of training such as the
location of the CHP, SDS, and safety
reporting system. Training appears to
be correlated to knowledge of hazardous waste disposal procedures.
However, quite interestingly, there
was not an apparent correlation
between hazardous waste training
and confidence in making hazardous
waste determinations, suggesting
low self-efficacy in this area. The
correlation between safety training
and self-efficacy warrants further
investigation.
This study also showed a concerning trend of laboratory activities
that not only violate institutional
guidelines and contradict training,
but also pose safety risks to faculty,
staff, and students. Faculty reported
using defective equipment and a low
rate of disinfection of communal
eyewear between users. Lab supervisors have a responsibility to set
the example and to ensure the safety
of those working in their laboratory. Therefore, all lab supervisors
should ensure adequate storage for
equipment, be aware of needed and
implemented engineering controls
such as GFI outlets, establish ap-
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propriate administrative controls
(e.g., SOPs), and ensure proper eye
protection is available for workers.
Our survey suggests this is an area
of growth.
The results of this survey reveal
that there are gaps in actual engagement of some levels of the safety
culture (e.g., disconnected communication) as well as perceived gaps
in engagement (e.g., perception of
inadequate safety resources). There
is promise, though, that faculty report strong engagement in preparing
safety policies and procedures at all
levels. While this survey could not
adequately explore the hypothesis
that organization engagement with
safety culture at multiple levels positively impacts faculty self-efficacy
regarding safety, this survey does
provide foundational evidence for
how to explore this more deeply
in a future study. Faculty are open
to nonpunitive review, which may
have a positive impact on faculty
self-efficacy. It would be interesting to more deeply explore how the
connection between a disciplinary
approach versus a collaborative approach could influence self-efficacy.
The literature review suggested
that there is weak safety culture
within academic laboratories. The
research indicates this remains
problematic to address within higher
education. Future researchers should
explore management and employee
attitudes toward safety to determine
if these attitudes are a barrier to effectively reporting safety compliance
data. Future researchers could also
compare and contrast safety attitudes
and behaviors based on moderating
variables such as age, gender, experience, title, field of expertise, connection to industry, and other potential
moderating variables. ■
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